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Entitlement, Process, and Legitimacy in the Emergent
International Law of Secession
OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR*
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada
'Living with differences ought to be a cardinal principle of all societies,
but it must be abandoned when it results in repeated genocide.' Makau
MutuaI
'This term [legitimacy] is meant to designate the beliefs and attitudes that
members have towards the [institutions] and society they make up.' Charles
Taylor 2

1. Introduction
In 1996, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 3 issued its
now famous decision in Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire.4 About two
years later, in 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada 5 issued its equally famous
decision in Reference Re Secession of Quebec.6 Both decisions addressed
crucial and highly controversial questions regarding the right of a section of an
existing country to secede. Both decisions concluded that the particular
claimants of the secessionist entitlement in the extant cases were not entitled to
secede from the states to which they currently belonged. However, both
decisions also concluded that in a narrow range of exceptional cases, a discrete
Assistant Professor of Law and SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow on Peace and Security in a
Changing World, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. The author would like
*

to thank Antony Anghie, Obijiofor Aginam, James Gathii, and Karin Mickelson for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of the paper, and Shedrack Agbakwa for his research assistance.
I M. Mutua, 'Africans have Learned the Hard Way that Ethnic Rivalries cannot be Erased' The
Boston Globe, 21 April 1999.
2
See C. Taylor, Reconciling Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993) at 64.
3
Hereinafter referred to as 'the African Commission'.
4
Communication No. 75/92, reproduced in (1996) 3 International Human Rights Reports 136
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Katanga Case').
5
Hereinafter referred to as 'the Supreme Court'.
6
(1998) 2 S.C.R. 217, hereinafter referred to as 'the Quebec Case'.
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section of an existing state would be entitled to secede from that state. This,
however, is where the similarities between the two cases end.
Perhaps, the most important of the differences between the two cases relates
to the alternative models of secessionist dispute management that are
symbolized by the two cases. Each of them symbolizes a fundamentally
different model. On the one hand, the Katanga case involved the reference of a
secessionist dispute between a central government (Zaire) and one of its
constituent units (Katanga/Shaba) to an international tribunal (the African
Commission) that was a third party to the dispute. On the other hand, the
Quebec Case involved the reference of a dispute between a central government
(Canada) and one of its constituent units (Quebec) to a domestic tribunal (the
Supreme Court) that functions as one of the three arms of that same central
7
government.
This fundamental difference in the alternative models of secessionist
dispute management that are symbolized by these two cases raises at least one
very important set of questions regarding the legitimacy of processes and
outcomes in the context of the management of an extremely high stakes ultrapolitical question 8 such as a secessionist claim. This set of legitimacy questions
are entailed by prior questions regarding the desirability of generalizing the
somewhat dyadic model of secessionist dispute management that is symbolized
by the Quebec case (as opposed to the much more triadic model that is
symbolized by the Katanga case). 9 A concomitant question is the extent to
which other countries that are faced with similar secessionist claims ought to
adopt the model of secessionist dispute resolution that is symbolized by the
Quebec case (as opposed to the model that is symbolized by the Katanga
case)? For, if the credibility and legitimacy of a model of secessionist
dispute management is crucial to its eventual effectiveness, then the more
serious the legitimacy deficits that afflict a model of secessionist dispute
management, the less likely it is to perform effectively in the long run. And if
the legitimacy deficits that afflict one of these models of secessionist dispute
management are significantly more serious than those that afflict the other, it
should follow logically that the less problematic model (from the legitimacy

7 Like virtually every other scholar, Peter Hogg, who is widely regarded as Canada's foremost
constitutional scholar, clearly regards the court as an integral arm of Canada's federal government. See
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student edn. (Scarborough, Ontario: Carswell, 2000) at
pp. 201-202; 221-245.
8 The high stakes political nature of this matter is widely acknowledged in the literature. For
instance, in the Quebec Case, the Attorney-General of Canada noted in her factum that: 'The
Government of Quebec and of Canada are in disagreement over a process so serious that it could lead to
the secession of Quebec'. See A. Bayefsky, Self-determination in International Law: Quebec and
Lessons Learned (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 13.
9 The concepts of dyadic and triadic models of dispute management are explained more fully in
section III of this paper.
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perspective) ought to be preferred to the more problematic one. It also follows

that the more problematic model ought not be adopted too hastily in other
places (especially in very deeply fragmented societies: where the very question
of the legitimacy of state institutions is all-too-often a central concern among

aggrieved sub-state groups).
Much of this paper is devoted to critically examining the alternative models

of dispute management that are symbolized by the Katanga and Quebec cases.
This is done with a view to evaluating the desirability of each of these models
as general frameworks that might guide those concerned to manage secessionist
disputes between states and sub-state groups. The central concern will be the

extent to which either model satisfies what most people in most places seem to
regard as basic requirements of procedural fairness, and the extent to which a
failure in that regard is likely to affect the legitimacy of the processes and
outcomes that follow from that model. The assumption is of course that the
perceived fairness of a process and an outcome are intricately connected to
their perceived legitimacy. 10 This critical interrogation of the structures of

adjudication that are symbolized by the instant cases is not based on a mere
formalist quibble. Indeed, this enterprise seems both necessary and worthwhile

precisely because it is the perceived unfairness and illegitimacy of the
structures, workings and decisions of state institutions and processes that is

all-too-often at the root of secessionist agitations, ethnic conflicts, social
dislocations, and global instabilities." Thus, the set of questions to be
addressed under this 'legitimacy' rubric is of utmost relevance to the peaceable
management of the secessionist ambitions of a large number of ethnic and
national minorities/groups the world over. 12 They are therefore relevant as well
to the sustained maintenance of international peace.
But before delving into that aspect of the paper, it is necessary to examine
another crucial set of issues that is raised by the decisions in the Katanga and

10 See T.M. Franck, Fairnessin InternationalLaw andInstitutions (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995) at 25-41. See also O.C. Okafor, 'Is there a Legitimacy Deficit in International Law and
Institutions' (1997) 13 (Special Issue) International Insights 91 at 96-97.
1l See I.S. Shivji, 'The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: An African Perspective' in
W. Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) at 35-37;
V.P. Nanda, infra note 18 at 265; H. Hannum, Infra note 18 at 8-9 and 469; and N. Berman, 'Sovereignty
in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law' (1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal
51 at 53.
12 See M. Mutua, 'Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry' (1995) 16
Michigan Journal of International Law 1113. See also O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood:
InternationalLaw and State Fragmentation in Africa (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000); and O.C.
Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate
Statehood in Africa' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 503. For the relevance of this
question to the minority populations of a country that is widely viewed as one of the most developed in
the world, see M.D. Walters, 'Nationalism and the Pathology of Legal Systems: Considering the Quebec
Secession Reference and its Lessons for the United Kingdom' (1999) 62 Modem Law Review 371 at 372
(pointing out the interest with which secession is regarded by many in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland - all parts of the United Kingdom).
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Quebec cases: the highly controversial question of the contemporary existence,
albeit in a highly limited form, of an internationallegal entitlement to secede;
one that may be considered and pronounced upon by a judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal. A related question relates to the existence as part of African regional
international law of a limited, treaty-based (as opposed to custom-based),
entitlement to secede from an already de-colonized state. Another related
question concerns the possible affirmation in the Supreme Court's decision of
a multilateral (as opposed to a unilateral) international legal entitlement to
secession; an entitlement that seems to have a novel and useful aspect. It is
important that these questions be examined at this point in the paper for the
reason that it is only in the context of the existence of such an international
legal entitlement that a serious discussion of the legitimacy deficits of each of
the two alternative models of secessionist dispute management is sensible.
Why quibble about the structure of a formal adjudicative process in the absence
of an entitlement that the process might in fact be able to adjudicate?
Thus, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically (but briefly)
examines the question of the contribution of the Quebec and Katanga Cases to
the clarification of the international law of secession, an area of international
law that is to this day steeped in far too much disagreement. 13 Section 3
critically examines (from a legitimacy perspective) the two alternative models
of secessionist dispute management that are symbolized by the Quebec and
Katanga cases, respectively. It inquires the extent to which either model
represents a significant departure from popularly accepted, widely established,
and clearly imperative understandings of fair process, and the extent to which
such a deviation (if any) might detract from the legitimacy (as opposed to the
legality) of that model. As an integral part of this analysis, it also examines the
capacity of either model to advance or inhibit the causes of oppressed minority
groups the world over. Following this analytical inquiry, the article concludes
with a summary of the questions raised and the suggestions made in each

respect. 14
13 See J. Oloka-Onyango, 'Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-Determination: Prospects
and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millenium' (1999) 15 American University
InternationalLaw Review 151 at 196-204.

14 It is extremely important, at this juncture, to delimit the scope of this paper. It is important to
understand that due to space limitations, primarily, the paper is not concerned with a number of related
and otherwise important issues. These include: the relationship between the two models of secessionist
dispute management and the likelihood that states might recognize the statehood of a sub-state group that
has seceded successfully from its parent state; the existence of a custom-based secessionist entitlement
under international law; the philosophical and other arguments for or against the existence of a right to
secession; and the question whether Quebec is or is not entitled to secede. Rather, the paper is limited to
a consideration of the existence of a secessionist entitlement that is based on certain treaty and soft-law
instruments, especially those considered in the Katanga and Quebec cases, as well as a discussion of the
legitimacy questions that arise from the nature of each of the two models of secessionist dispute
resolution that are symbolized respectively by the two cases.
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2. Secession: An Emergent International Legal Entitlement?
This section begins by discussing, albeit in summary form, the traditional
position of international law regarding the entitlement of sub-state groups to
secede from already independent states. Next, it examines the nature of
international law's attitude to the question of the existence of a secessionist
entitlement post the Katanga and Quebec cases. As an intricate part of that more
extensive examination, it muses on the implications of the current international
legal position in this area for the advancement of the status of oppressed or
powerless minority groups.
It is well accepted among scholars that traditional international law was, for
5
the most part, insensitive to the separatist demands of sub-state groups.' As
such, that normative order was widely viewed as concomitantly resistant to the
emergence of a secessionist entitlement. 16 As Antonio Cassese has suggested,
international law has (historically) been:
'[b]lind to the demands of ethnic groups, and national, religious, cultural, or
linguistic minorities. Not only does international law refrain from granting
any right of internal or external self-determination to these groups, it also
fails to provide any alternative remedy to the present plight of so many of
them.' 17
This attitude of the law has been widely recognized by, and reflected in, the
relevant scholarly literature. 18 As Joe Oloka-Onyango has recently noted:
'Traditional international law theorists have a deeply ingrained aversion to
contemplating the right to secede even in the abstract. Few are willing to
at all, and suggestions to the
infer that the right to secession even exists
9
contrary immediately draw a retraction."
15
See G.H. Fox, 'Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus' (1995) 16
Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw 733 at 736.
16 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal(Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1995) at 273-359. This kind of resistance is also present in non-legal discourse. See
W. Kymlicka, 'Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad' (2000) 13 Canadian Journalof Law
and Jurisprudence 207.

17

A. Cassese, ibid. at 328.
See

for

instance H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The
Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) at 49;
of
Conflicting
Accomodation
IS

V.P. Nanda, 'Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede' (1981) 13 Case
Western Reserve JournalofInternationalLaw 257 at 263-279; and L.-C. Chen, 'Self-Determination and
World Public Order' (1991) 66 Notre Dame Law Review 1287 at 1294-1297.
'9
See J. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 13 at 198-199. An example of this position is C. Gans,
'National Self-Determination: A Sub and Inter-Statist Conception' (2000) 13 CanadianJournal of Law
and Jurisprudence185. Given the fact that secessionist agitations have continued to occur the world over
despite the reluctance of traditional international law scholarship and practice to contemplate the

emergence of a broad right of secession, it seems rather curious that this traditional attitude continues
nevertheless to dominate current thinking in this area. See D.M. Weinstock, 'Toward a Proceduralist
Theory of Secession' (2000) 13 CanadianJournal of Law and Jurisprudence 251 at 161.
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Scholars are, however, now unanimous in their agreement that contemporary
international law recognizes the right of colonized peoples to elect to secede
from the political control of their colonial masters. 20 Ian Brownlie, a widely
respected scholar, has even suggested that this anti-colonial norm may have
attained the rank of a peremptory norm of general international law from which
no derogation is permissible (i.e.jus cogens);2 1 an assertion to which Frederic
Kirgis, another important scholar, has given qualified approval.2 2
What is still an extremely controversial issue is the existence of an
international legal right entitling a people to secede from the already decolonized state that they currently inhabit: i.e. a legal entitlement to secede in a
non-colonial context. Most scholars have suggested that no such international
legal entitlement exists. For instance, Hurst Hannum is of the view that
constant state practice and the weight of authority require the conclusion that
the right of a non-colonial people to secede does not yet exist in international
law (a separate question from its desirability).23 Similarly, prominent scholars
such as Antonio Cassese and Thomas Franck have suggested that international
law neither allows nor denies this entitlement to sub-state groups. 24 Yet, a
number of scholars (including many who deny that there is an international
legal right to secession) have affirmed, however, that the right to selfdetermination (which might ground the right to secession) extends in some
other forms to the non-colonial context. 25 Thus, because there is already
enough widespread agreement that the right to self-determination is not limited
to the colonial context, it is now clear that sub-state groups are entitled to
exercise the right to self-determination in one form or another. What remains

20
21
22

See A. Cassese, supra note 16 at 133-140; L-C Chen, supra note 18 at 1294.
See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public InternationalLaw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) at 513.

See F. Kirgis, 'The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era' (1994) 88

American Journalof InternationalLaw 304 at 305.
23

See H. Hannum, supra note 18 at 49.

24

See T.M. Franck, 'Post-Modem Tribalism and the Right to Secession' in C. Brolman,

R. Lefeber, and M. Zieck (eds.), Peoples and Minorities in InternationalLaw (Dordrecht: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1993) at 12-13; C. Tomuschat, 'Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World' in C. Tomuschat
(ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) at 7; J. Dugard,

'Secession: Is the Case of Yugoslavia a Precedent for Africa?' (1992) 5 African Journal ofInternational
and Comparative Law 163 at 165; and H. Hannum, 'Re-Thinking
Virginia Journal of InternationalLaw 1.

Self-Determination'

(1993) 34

25 See for instance R. McCorquodale, 'Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context and its
Potential Impact on Africa' (1992) 4 African Journal of Internationaland ComparativeLaw 592 at 593;
R. McCorquordale, 'Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach' (1994) 43 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 857 at 860-861; G.H. Tesfagiorgis, 'Self-Determination: Its Evolution and
Practice by the United Nations and its Application to the case of Eritrea' (1987) 6 Wisconsin
InternationalLaw Journal 75; M.G.K. Nayar, 'Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra
in Retrospect' (1975) 10 Texas InternationalLaw Journal321 at 337; M. Haile, 'Legality of Secessions:
The Case of Eritrea' (1994) 8 Emory InternationalLaw Review 479 at 488-536; T.M. Franck, supra note
10at 11.
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hotly disputed is whether that entitlement
to non-colonial self-determination
extends to the right to secede from an
already independent state.
It is against this discursive background
that, at the very least since the
decisions in the Katanga and Quebec
cases, it is no longer prudent to argue
with confidence against the existence
in some highly limited form of an
international legal entitlement to secede
(in exceptional cases) from an already
de-colonized state; an entitlement that
judicial/quasi-judicial institutions may
consider and pronounce on. In the same
vein, this paper argues that even more
compelling is the fact that the decision
in the Katanga case has left very little
room for reasonable doubt as to the
existence, as part of African regional
international law of a treaty-based, conditional,
and limited entitlement to
secession. If this suggestion is correct,
then it would be fair to suggest that
traditional understandings of this area
of the law must now give way to
readings of the subject-matter that
are more closely reflective of a
contemporary audit of the decisions
of relevant international law decisionmaking fora.
Although Stephen Toope questions the
existence of the right of secession,
'[mjy point is not that a broad customary
norm allowing unilateral secession
now exists; that point is dubious at best', 26
the current article advances to the
question of the burden of proof. As both
the Katanga and the Quebec cases
show, several treaty and soft law-based
provisions allow that right (albeit in
a limited form), and that especially in the
light of the decision in the Katanga
case, a very heavy burden must lie on
a scholar who insists on offering a
different interpretation of the relevant
treaty-provisions than those offered in
the relevant decisions. This is so since
such decisions have proceeded from
tribunals that have up to now been widely
accepted as authoritative. That
burden, dischargeable as it is, is highly
onerous nevertheless. This will become
apparent from an analytical discussion of
the relevant details of the decisions in
the two cases.
In the Quebec case, after affirming that
the right of a colonized sub-state
group to choose independence from
the group's colonizer 'is now
undisputed', 27 the Supreme Court went
much further to hold that:
'In summary, the international law
right to self-determination only
generates, at best, a right to external
self-determination [secession] ...
where a people are oppressed,
as for example under foreign
military occupation; or where a definable
group is denied meaningful
access to government to pursue theirpolitical,
economic, socialand cultural

26

27

See S. Toope, infra note
29 at 524.
Supra note 6 at 285.
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development... Such exceptional circumstances are manifestly inapplicable
to Quebec under existing conditions.' 28 (emphasis added)

Inherent in the court's reasoning is a cautious affirmation (based mostly on the
examination of international law treaties, soft law instruments, and the writing

of some prominent scholars) 29 of the existence, in highly exceptional cases, of
an international legal entitlement to unilateral secession; one that may be

claimed by a sub-state group in a suit at law and adjudicated upon by a judicial
or quasi-judicial tribunal. Indeed, by explicitly considering the facts relating to
Quebec's socio-political and economic status within Canada, and finding that
Quebec was so well treated by Canada that it did not meet the extremely high
threshold that must be met before a sub-state group becomes entitled (as of
right) to secede from an already independent state, the court was signalling
clearly that the limited entitlement to secede was of a legal nature (whatever

that might mean), and was capable of being considered and pronounced upon
by a judicial/quasi-judicial body. The legal nature of this limited secessionist
entitlement was affirmed by the court notwithstanding the fact that the court
had (as it was fully entitled to) 30 considered the case under its advisory
jurisdiction, as opposed to its more usual adjudicatory jurisdiction. 31 Indeed,
the court went to great lengths to fend off a challenge to its assumption of

jurisdiction in this case: a challenge that was based on the supposed nonjusticiability of the question of Quebec's entitlement to unilateral secession
from Canada! 32 I am therefore in agreement with Mark Walters that with
respect to the Quebec case, all is said and done:

'[t]he nine supreme court justices ruled unanimously that... Canada [an
independent state] is divisible and (by implication) destructible, and that
there are legal rules governing such a division.' 33 (emphasis added)

28
29

Ibid. at 287.
See S. Toope, 'Re Reference by Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating to

Secession of Quebec from Canada' (1999) 93 American Journal of InternationalLaw 519 at 524.
Emphasis supplied. I agree with Stephen Toope that the given its inattention to customary international
law, the court's methodology is somewhat suspect. But Toope's main argument is largely that the court
lost the opportunity to examine the veracity of assertions in the literature of the existence of several types
of circumstances under which customary international law would recognize a right to secession. This is
an argument for completeness, a case for why the court ought to have considered more scenarios than it
did. This is an argument that the court could have affirmed or rejected a more expansive right to
secession. It is not, however, an attack on the specific forms of the entitlement to secession that the court
affirmed. See S. Toope, Ibid. at 524.
30 A well-known constitutional scholar, Patrick Monahan, has described the court's reference
jurisdiction in this case as 'unassailable'. See P. Monahan, 'The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Secession Reference' (1999-2000) 11 NationalJournal of ConstitutionalLaw 65 at 69.
31 Supra note 6 at 227-235.
32
Ibid. at 25-239.
33 See M.D. Walters, supra note 12 at 371.
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Considering the nature of the textual provisions on which the court's decisions in
the area of international law were largely based, it is extremely difficult to assail
either the court's reasoning or its conclusions. Article 1 common to the two UN
human rights covenants 34 provides a ight to self-determination that many authors
see no good reason to limit to the colonial context. 35 Indeed, there is nothing in the
plain words of these provisions that suggests that they do not authorize secession
in the kinds of highly exceptional cases in which the court would allow it. Those
interpretations of these provisions that regard them as not permitting secession
except in the colonial context are based largely on attempts to decipher the
customary international law relative to the secession of sub-state groups. But
since it is quite possible for a treaty to permit a course of conduct that is not as yet
permitted by customary international law, it is difficult to see why our
understanding of the plain and non-circumscribed words of these provisions
should be limited so fundamentally by the presumed absence of a custom-based
secessionist entitlement. The traditional view is even more intriguing given the
conclusion of a number of eminent scholars that contemporary customary
international law neither authorizes nor prohibits secession. This is a position that
would clearly allow for an interpretation of these treaty provisions that remains
consistent with paragraph five of the relevant section of the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, i.e. Resolution 2645 (XV). This is the position that the
Supreme Court has (quite correctly in my view) adopted.
Interestingly enough, in addition to affirming the right to unilateral
secession in three highly exceptional circumstances, the court also recognized
another kind of secessionist entitlement: the right to pursue secession in a
multilateral way, i.e. through negotiations with other relevant entities in the
relevant state. As enunciated by the court, this is a general legal right that is
available both to sub-state groups who do not find themselves in the three
situations covered by the entitlement to unilateral secession, and those who find
themselves in those situations. So notwithstanding that a sub-state group is not
colonized, or oppressed, or denied meaningful access to the governance of their
current country, they may still, like Quebec, elect to pursue secession through
negotiations. And as along as the other units within that country agree, such
a sub-state group should be able to secede from a parent state. This reasoning
seems unassailable. Has it not always been within the legal (or meta-legal)
rights of a sub-state group to negotiate its exit from an independent state?
Examples of such peaceful and consensual dissolutions are not at all hard to
find.36 In this sense this line of reasoning is not really novel at all. Perhaps its
major innovation is that under the court's scheme for the occurrence of such
multilateral negotiations regarding secession, when faced with a clear decision
34
35
36

See, e.g., Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, infra note 79.
See T.M. Franck, supra note 10.
See L.C. Buchheit, infra note 58.
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in favour of secession made by the membership of the relevant sub-state group,
the central government is legally obligated to negotiate in good faith with
the secessionist sub-state group. In such a case, the central government
cannot simply refuse to negotiate secession. Also, it cannot, as was once
fashionable, simply deploy violence to crush the expressed will of the relevant
population: such conduct is no longer likely to be viewed as lawful. This is the
innovative component of this additional entitlement to multilateral secession;
one that is clearly of benefit to oppressed sub-state groups the world over. One
possible objection to the existence of this procedural right to multilateral
secession as part of international law is that it was derived from an analysis of
Canadian constitution law, and not from international law as such. A reading of
the decision makes it clear, however, that the court is of the view that
international law does not explicitly prohibit such consensual multilateral
secessions. This is apparent from the court's final decision that there was no
conflict between international law and Canadian law in the context of the
questions put to it in the reference. 37 It is also implied in the court's restriction
of the law's prohibition of certain kinds of secession to the realm of cases of
unilateral secession by non-colonized sub-state groups that are neither
oppressed nor fundamentally excluded from power.
As will become obvious in the following segments of this section, the legal
reasoning of the African Commission in the Katanga case is strikingly similar
in spirit, if not always in letter, to the reasoning in the Quebec case.
In the Katanga case, the African Commission was seized of a communication brought by the President of the Katangese Peoples' Congress [in
Zaire] requesting the commission to, inter alia, recognize the independence of
Katanga and help secure the evacuation of Zaire from Katanga. This
communication claimed that Zaire, a state party to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights 38 had violated Article 20 of that Charter. Among
other things, that provision, guarantees the right to self-determination to both
'colonized and oppressed peoples' in Africa. Having declared the communication
admissible, and having considered its claims, the African Commission held that:
'In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the
point that the territorialintegrity ofZaire should be called into question and
in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the fight to
participate in government as guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the African
Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise
a variant of self-determination39 that is compatible with the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Zaire.'

37
38
39

(1998) 2 S.C.R. 217 at 292.
Reproduced in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 59 (hereinafter referred to as the 'African Charter').
Supra note 4 at 136.
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One thing that is striking about this decision is the extent to which its legal
reasoning was, in effect, endorsed in the admittedly much more extensive
judgement of the Supreme Court in the Quebec case. Just like the court in the
Quebec case, the African Commission denied that the relevant claimant
(Katanga in this case) was, in this specific circumstance, entitled to secede
from the already independent state of which they were a part (i.e. Zaire). Just
like the court in the Quebec case, the African Commission took it for granted
that every colonized people possess the international legal right to secede,
should they so choose, from the relevant colonial state. Just like the court in the
Quebec case, the African Commission affirmed the existence, in two noncolonial contexts, of a limited international legal entitlement to secede: i.e. in
the case of an oppressed people ('serious human rights violations'), and in the
case of a people who have been denied meaningful participation in the
governance of their country ('denial of Article 13(1) rights'). Just like the court
in the Quebec case, the African Commission understood this entitlement as one
upon which a quasi-judicial body such as itself is entitled to adjudicate. Like
the court in the Quebec case, the African Commission unanimously held in
favour of a limited form of the secessionist entitlement, one that is available
only in highly exceptional circumstances.
Up to this point, the legal reasoning that grounds the decisions in the two
cases are largely ad idem. One difference, however, is that unlike the court in
the Quebec case which was clearly engaged in the interpretation of the global
international legal position on the issues, the African Commission's task was
much more geographically limited. It was engaged in the interpretation of the
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (a widely
ratified 1981 treaty that is inapplicable beyond the African continent). Another
significant difference between the two cases is that the African Commission
did not have the opportunity to delve into the question of the existence or
otherwise of a right to pursue secession in a multilateral manner (i.e. via
political negotiations). At the same time though, there is nothing in the instant
decision that indicates that the African Commission would have viewed such a
right with disfavour. Yet another difference is that while the court in the
Quebec case was a domestic judicial body with binding legal authority, the
African Commission is an international quasi-judicial body with no binding
legal authority as such. n0 In the present context, however, such a distinction is

without any real significance. Was not the Supreme Court acting in its advisory
role in the Quebec case? Was that role not functionally similar to that usually
performed by the African Commission? In any case, at the moment, the
40
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African Commission remains the only functional institution that the African
Charter has itself charged with the authoritative interpretation of the provisions
of that document. 4 1 All in all, it is very clear (from the italicized part of the
decision that has been reproduced above) that had the Katangese Peoples'
Congress introduced the kind of evidence that met the threshold that was stated
by the Commission, it would have (at least in the view of the Commission)
been legally entitled to secede from Zaire. That is a logical deduction that is
potentially very significant, not just in the African context, but in the rest of the
world as well.
In order to understand more fully the huge significance of this decision,
especially for most states and sub-state groups in Africa, a number of matters
have to be kept in mind. The first is the extreme disfavour with which
secession has been viewed historically among the vast majority of African
states. 42 The second is the concomitant historical insistence of most African
governments on both the absolute application of the doctrine of uti possidetis
and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of decolonized African states.4 3
These two doctrines are so well established that, quite understandably, even
this extremely forward-looking African Commission still felt obliged to
indicate, in their decision, a considerable measure of respect for them. The
third is the considerable extent and weight of the negative interpretive opinion
that existed in the period before and after this decision was issued. The first two
factors are so widely acknowledged as factual that this paper will concentrate
on demonstrating the last one only.
As recently as 1999, Joe Oloka-Onyango, a well-respected African scholar
who has himself argued strongly in favour of the creation of a more general
right to secession, felt able to dismiss as mere 'wishful thinking' the assertion
by another scholar that general international law already recognizes a limited
right to secession. 44 Yet, the decision in the Katanga case was published in
1996. While Oloka-Onyango was on surer ground when he concluded that
global international law (as opposed to African regionalinternational law) does
not as yet recognize a broad right of secession, he cannot be right if he meant
to conclude as well that no limited form of the secessionist entitlement had at
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the relevant time been recognized by either general or African international
law. Isaa Shivji, another one of the many important scholars who have
advocated the creation of a general right to secession, is of the view that the
Article 20 of the African Charter, the very same provision that was invoked,
considered, and interpreted in the Katanga case, does not guarantee a right to
secession in the non-colonial context. 45 Richard Gittleman even predicted
(rather incorrectly as it turns out) that secessionist movements or peoples
would not, in furtherance of their causes, be entitled to rely on the right to self46
determination enshrined in the same Article 20 of the African Charter.
Richard Kiwanuka, Gino Naldi, and Emmanuel Bello came to similar
conclusions regarding the meaning and applicability of the very same
provision. 47 Perhaps the only notable exceptions to this steady drum of
scholarly opinion regarding the intent of Article 20 are the opinions of Oji
Umozurike (a long-serving member of the African Commission) and Angela
Lloyd. Both have suggested that Article 20 of the African Charter clearly
guarantees a treaty-based right of secession, one that may in exceptional cases
be claimed by a secessionist sub-state group. Both commentators have based
their conclusions on what they see as the very plain language of the
provision. 48 Indeed, Umozurike has made the extremely crucial distinction
between colonized and oppressed peoples. A people who are not colonized may
still be oppressed in other ways! Is colonization not merely one specific kind
of oppression? Indeed in Umozurike's own words:
'OAU member states [i.e. African states] have no colonized people in
their territories but some have oppressed people; both types of victims are
entitled to free themselves by resorting to appropriate means.' 49 (emphasis
added)
It is therefore clear that Article 20 of the African Charter guarantees a form of
self-determination that may in some exceptional circumstances entitle a noncolonized people like the Katangese to secede from an already independent
state such as Zaire. This entitlement is a part only of the treaty-based regional
internationallaw applicable in Africa. Its content is, however, virtually on all
45
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fours with the limited entitlement to secession that was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the Quebec case. 50 This is the chief similarity between the
legal reasoning of both the Supreme Court and the African Commission.
In both of these generally salutary cases, the long-term interests of states as
well as of minority and/or powerless sub-state groups are well served. A
colonized people are clearly recognized as repositories of a 'secessionist'
entitlement. Minority and/or powerless sub-state groups, that are either
seriously oppressed or fundamentally excluded over time from meaningful
participation in the governance of their own country, will have a legal
entitlement to secede from the relevant oppressive state. And this is an
entitlement that may be considered and adjudicated by a judicial or quasijudicial tribunal institution. This legal state of affairs will encourage such
minorities to seek redress for their grievances through more peaceable ways:
rather than simply resorting to defensive violence against an oppressive state,
such minorities will have a more credible alternative to violent action than a
stoic acceptance of their fate as a victimized group. This legal state of
affairs will thus remove a very important source of frustration for such
aggrieved groups: namely, the absence of credible fora for the peaceable and
focused consideration of their claim to secede; fora that are not dominated
and controlled by the relevant state.5 1 For their own part, states will be
reminded, in a very clear way, that they pursue policies of colonization,
excessive political centralization, homogenization, exclusion, and repression,
at their peril. 5 2 This legal state of affairs will also demand that if states are
determined to maintain their territorial integrity, they must be equally
determined to refrain from treating any of their sub-state groups in a way
that would concomitantly entitle that group to secede from the relevant state! In
any case, where a sub-state group has been severely mistreated, 'territorial
integrity is self-defeating' for the state itself.53 This is so because, when the
population of a state remains deeply cleaved, including psychologically, as it
usually becomes in such cases, the relevant state's territory may remain
54
physically contiguous without being 'integral' in any real way.
Having made this point, it is also important to note that neither the
Katanga case nor the Quebec case supports a broad right of secession in every
conceivable circumstance for every aggrieved sub-state group. What both
cases suggest is the existence of a highly circumscribed entitlement. The two
50
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tribunals were extremely conscious of the fact that, as Oji Umozurike has
reminded us, most responsible scholars accept the idea that 'the independence
variant of self-determination will not be lightly entertained in the absence of
compelling circumstances'. 55 Indeed, there are compelling social reasons for
the endorsement of this kind of measured approach to adjudication of the
secessionist entitlement. As Rein Mullerson has noted:
'Human suffering in inter-ethnic conflicts following some recent cases of
secession should induce every responsible
person to think twice before
56
speaking in favour of any secession.'
It must be kept in mind, however, that it is not always that assertions of the
right to secession result in violent conflict. The separation of the Czechs and
the Slovaks was done by 'mutual assent'. 57 So was the secession of Singapore
from Malaysia in 1965.58 Assertions of the right to secession by Quebec has,
for the most part, not led to violent conflict in Canada. 59 Furthermore, as
Mullerson has himself noted, 'the violence we see around us is not generated
by the drive for self-determination, but by its negation [by the activities of
oppressive states]'. 60 Thus, were states to adopt a less bellicose posture to the
autonomy claims of sub-state groups, and not rush to violently suppress the
slightest indication of separatism, violence would hardly attend most attempts
to vindicate such claims. Indeed, part of the reason for the penchant of states to
violently suppress secessionist sub-state groups is that they think that they can
do so within the law: they believe that secession is absolutely illegal under
international law, and that the law entitles independent states to deploy
violence in order to suppress any conduct that6 they perceive as demonstrative
of an attempt by a sub-state group to secede. '
The foregoing paragraphs have demonstrated the basis for my suggestion
that the Katanga and Quebec cases point in the direction of the emergence of a
number of highly circumscribed treaty(and soft-law)-based entitlements to
secession (as opposed to a broad customary international law norm in favour of
secession); rights that are often claimed by sub-state groups and denied by
55
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states. Having done so, and since disputed entitlements must be adjudicated
according to one kind of process or the other, the stage is set for an analytical
examination, in the next section, of the contrasting models of secessionist
dispute management processes that are symbolized by the Katanga and Quebec
cases. This examination will be conducted with a view to assessing the
legitimacy deficits, if any, that afflict these models, while musing on the
desirability of both models as general frameworks for the management of
secessionist disputes.

3. Secession: Re-Conceiving Process, Enhancing Legitimacy?
This section of the paper will, first of all, consider the nature of one of the basic
requirements of fair process. Next, it will examine briefly the incorporation,
into some of the world's legal systems, of that requirement of fair process.
Following that discussion, it will relate the relevant requirement of fair process
to the question of the perceived legitimacy of either of the alternative models
of secessionist dispute management that are symbolized by the Katanga and
Quebec cases. The central concern that will animate this discussion will be the
extent to which a process of secessionist dispute management that is based on
either model is more likely to be viewed as fair and/or legitimate (especially by
the losing side)? Intricately connected to this legitimacy question are the
musings as to the capacity of these models to better advance the causes of
oppressed or powerless sub-state groups the world over.
It is generally accepted, virtually everywhere in the world, that disputes are
more likely to be resolved in a way thatfosters and sustains the confidence of
the parties thereto in the legitimacy of the processes involved, and the
outcomes that are entailed, if such disputes are adjudicated, mediated or
62
otherwise managed by a relatively detached and independent third party.
Indeed, Alec Stone Sweet has recently reminded us that:
- constitutes a
'The triad - two contracting parties and a dispute resolver
63
primal social institution, a microcosm of governance.'
The triadic (i.e. the relatively detached and independent third party) model of
dispute management is opposed to the dyadic (i.e. the exclusively inter-party)
model.64 A good example of dyadic dispute resolution is a situation where two
friends simply meet to settle between them and by themselves a dispute over
62
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a personal loan. In such a case, all of the participants in the dispute
management process are disputants as well.
This dyadic model is rendered triadic by the 'injection of an external
presence ' 65 in the form of a relatively detached and independent third party
dispute 'resolver'. This is the structure of adjudication that is favoured almost
exclusively in the management of disputes by judicial and quasi-judicial
institutions the world over.6 6 And virtually every serious dispute concerning
the legal rights and obligations of the members of virtually every society in
the world are now settled in one triadic form or the other. Whether or not these
disputes are settled in a court of law, strictly so called, or in an alternative
dispute resolution forum, a triadic model of adjudication is usually entailed.
This does not mean, however, that dyadic or quasi-dyadic dispute management
is not somewhat ubiquitous in most societies. 67 In any case, when citizens sue
the government in a domestic court of law, the model of dispute management
that is entailed is not purely or classically triadic. For, are courts of law not part
of a state's judiciary? And is thejudiciary not one of the three arms of the very
government that has been sued? Again, is the judiciary not usually appointed
by, or intricately linked to, one or the other of the executive and legislative
arms of government? Is the court of law not therefore hard put to claim
'detached third party' status in the classic sense? The point is not that the
dyadic model does not at all inform the design of those of our adjudicative
structures that have been dedicated to the management of serious legal
disputes. The point is that the dyadic model's influence on the design of
such adjudicative structures is largely minimal - at least in the sense that,
even when the dyadic model appears to have influenced the design of
the adjudicative structures, serious attempts are usually made to secure for the
relevant adjudicators some measure of relative detachment and independence.
And it is hardly debatable that the insistence by so many legal systems on
the necessity of these measures reflects a deeply established aspiration to the
'triadic'.
That the triadic model of dispute management is deeply ingrained in the
structures and sensibilities of the judicial systems of most countries in the
world is evidenced by the virtually universal valency of the concept of nemo
judex in causa sua (that no one ought to be a judge in her own cause). In some
65
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countries this principle is recognized as a principle of 'natural justice', 68 in
others, as a requirement of 'fundamental justice'. 69 It is also recognized both in
the letter and the spirit of contemporary international human rights law. Indeed,
the principle is now so well established that most ordinary people have come to
take it for granted, and expect that it will be respected as a matter of course.
This is a principle that is so ingrained in the sensibilities of most people in most
places that there is very little room for reasonable doubt as to its stature as an
indispensable basic requirement of fair dispute management. In fact, dispute
management models that violate its tenets are most likely to be widely regarded
as unfair (especially by losing parties). 70 There is equally very little reasonable
doubt that this time-hallowed requirement is firmly etched in the minds of most
people in most places as a desideratum for the legitimacy of a dispute
management process and of its outcomes. Thus, dispute management models
7
that violate its core tenets are likely to be widely regarded as illegitimate. 1
In the context of the incorporation of this ethical requirement of fair
process by the jurisprudence of virtually every kind of legal system, a survey of
even a few sample jurisdictions is enough to show case the nature of this
fundamentality of this requirement of 'fairness as legitimacy'. In the case of
Nigeria, Phillip Nnaemeka-Agu, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of
Nigeria, has had occasion to reflect in extenso on the nature of the legal
concept of nemo judex in causa sua (that no person shall be a judge in his or
her own cause).72 In his view, this is a fundamental pillar of the concept of fair
judicial process in both the common law and non-common law worlds.73 More
generally, the fundamentality of this concept of fairness has recently been
emphasized by a diverse group of African scholars in the 1999 Dakar
Declaration on the Right to Fair Trial in Africa. 74 In Fawehinmi v. Legal
PractitionersDisciplinary Committee,75 this concept of fair judicial process
was applied and developed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria as a prohibition
against a person or institution sitting in judgement in a context in which either
party to the dispute does not, upon reasonable grounds, regard that person or
In Nigeria, for instance, this imperative is widely referred to as a principle of 'natural justice'.
See P. Nnaemeka-Agu, infra note 72.
69
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institution as a detached and impartial arbiter. In the case of Canada, Roderick
Macdonald has demonstrated how the kindred concept 'nemo iudex in causa
sua debet esse' (let no person be a judge in her or his own cause) has always
been a fundamental requirement of fair judicial process in Canada. In his view,
this concept of fairness requires that only a person who is capable of being
viewed by both parties to a dispute as an 'impartial and disinterested decision76
In Britain, Re Pinochet
maker' can lawfully adjudicate such a dispute.
77
Ugarte is a recent and powerful reminder of the hallowed place that this
requirement of fairness occupies in the minds of both judges and members of
the public alike (at least in Britain). In that case, the House of Lords was very
decision 78
publicly embarrassed when it had to set to aside its own earlier
concerning the possible extradition to Spain of General Pinochet Ugarte. The
court was compelled to so hold owing to the apprehension of bias on the part of
one of the judges that had heard the case, namely, Lord Hoffman (i.e. his
perceived partiality). This Law Lord had been shown to have very close links
with one of the participants in the case before the court, namely, Amnesty
International. He was, at least at the relevant time, a director and chair of
a charity that was intricately connected to Amnesty International. Futhermore,
contemporary international human rights law is most reflective of this same
concept of fair adjudicative process. Article 14 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights 79 provides for a concept of fair trial that entails
similar notions of fairness. This right is also enumerated by Article 7 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 80 Thus, it is clear that the
notion of fair adjudication that was suggested above enjoys widespread
approval in various parts of (if not throughout) the world. There is very little
doubt that dispute management models that violate its requirements are very
likely to be widely viewed as unfair and illegitimate (at least by the losing
side).
This is not to say, however, that a dyadic model of dispute management will
in all cases lead to serious doubts among the target audience regarding the
fairness and legitimacy of the judicial process. In fact, in most countries, courts
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of law appointed by the government of that country routinely manage disputes
between that same government and its citizens. Yet there is no evidence that
this ubiquitous model of judicial action is widely viewed as inherently unfair
and illegitimate. Where questions of unfairness and/or illegitimacy have arisen,
they have usually done so because of the performance of specific judges in
specific cases, not as a general comment on the very structure of adjudication
that is involved. The point though is that this quasi-dyadic model of judicial
action (in which an arm of a government adjudicates a dispute between
that same government and a citizen) is widely accepted by the public largely
because, by ensuring some measure of relative detachment and independence
for the courts of law, serious efforts have been made in that situation to aspire to
the triadic model. Where such serious efforts have not been made, and the
relative detachment and independence of the courts of law are in serious doubt,
the very structure of the judicial process is likely to be impugned by the public
as unfair and/or illegitimate. Put differently, in countries where, and in eras
when, such measures ensuring the detachment and independence of the courts
are either not in place or are not widely respected in practice, their judicial
systems are all-too-often widely viewed within the relevant populations as
unfair, illegitimate, or both. And one of the chief reasons for the likelihood
of this popular perception is that in such cases, the structure of adjudication in
those courts would, in effect, have leaned too far to the dyadic side of the dyadtriad continuum. The courts, in such cases, would have virtually become the
puppets of one or both of the other arms of the government; not the relatively
detached independent third parties that citizens, desirous as they are of the
8
triadic model, expect them to be.
Having shown that the quasi-dyadic adjudicative structure (in which an arm
of the government adjudicates a dispute between that same government and a
citizen) is prevalent, warts and all, the world over, it is still important to note
that it is not in every disputative context, that that model would be either
suitable or preferable. Indeed, that model is, as will be shown soon, highly
unsuitable as a general model for the management of the most highly divisive,
high stakes, and political kinds of disputes (such as disagreements regarding
secession).
It is only logical to expect that the more controversial, divisive, and high
stakes a political dispute is, the more likely it is that the legitimacy of the
process by which it is adjudicated would be closely scrutinized. In the context
of such close scrutiny of the legitimacy of the process of adjudication, it seems
logical to expect that the more detached and independent the process is, the
more likely it is to command (as opposed to demand) the imprimatur of popular
For instance, see O.N. Ogbu, 'The Judiciary in a Polity - A Force for Stability or Instability?:
The Nigerian Experience' (1999) 11 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 724 at
726-735.
s

EMERGENT INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SECESSION
legitimacy. And since the triadic model of dispute management, much more
than the dyadic model, better ensures the detachment and independence of
the adjudicator(s) (and therefore of the process), the triadic model is much
more preferable as a general framework for the management of such highly
divisive, high stakes, political disputes (as those concerning secession). In fact,
very few of the different genres of political disputes are more high states,
divisive, or controversial than disputes concerning the very division (even
destruction) of a country via the instrumentality of the successful secession
from that country of one of its constituent units! Such disputes concern matters
that are at the very foundations of the relevant state itself. Such disputes
concern the possibility of authorizing an event of incredibly momentous
consequences. Such disputes are most likely to generate a highly charged
political atmosphere. Secession and the nationalisms that are entailed are, as
that taxes
history tells us, potentially explosive issues. 82 Secession is a question
83
to extremes the emotional strength of all sides of the dispute.
These insights into the nature of secessionist disputes definitely apply to
both the broader political disputes that spawned the Katanga and Quebec cases,
as well as to the cases themselves. In both of these cases, it was clear that the
decision to refer the respective sets of secession questions to the Supreme
Court and the African Commission, respectively, was in each case part of
broader political strategies designed to advance one side of an extremely high
stakes political game. In the Katanga case, the Katangese Peoples' Congress
was in search of a pronouncement as to its international legal entitlement to
secede that could constitute an important resource in an already existing
decades old political and military struggle for the independence of the province
of Katanga from Zaire. Thus, the reference of this matter to the African
Commission, as well as the decision that was rendered, were both resources
that would be harnessed and pressed into the service of the high stakes politics
of secessionist agitation in Zaire. This is evident from the nature of the
questions posed, and requests made, to the African Commission. For instance,
the African Commission was asked to 'recognize the Katangese Peoples'
Congress as a liberation movement'.84 This was clearly a well thought out
strategy of mobilizing the language and style of the many liberation
movements that were successful either in de-colonizing African states or
ridding them of apartheid regimes. This appropriation of the term 'liberation
movement' was thus important in the context of securing international support
(especially in Africa) for the struggle of the Katangese to secede from Zaire.
82
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In the Quebec case, the reference was clearly a part of the Government of

Canada's larger political strategy designed to ensure that it did not lose the next
referendum, outlined as it turns out in its so-called 'Plan B'. 85 This plan was
hatched in the wake of the near success of the 1995 Quebec independence
referendum. 86 The gravamen of this plan was to clarify the process of secession
and make its costs more obvious to the Quebec electorate. 87 This was seen as

a strategy that would contribute immensely to the anti-secessionist cause of
the federal government and detract as immensely from the secessionist cause of

the Quebec government. Given Patrick Monahan's description of the Supreme
Court as 'a federal political institution', 88 and his conclusion that (in giving
something to each side of the dispute and avoiding all the hard questions, in

this case, 'the court may have been acting as politicians rather than as
judges' 89), it is even clearer that the court was itself quite cognizant of the
nature of this case as part and parcel of a broader high stakes political game.
That much is implied in its handling of the challenges posed by the amicus

curiae to its jurisdiction. 90 And if this is not sufficient evidence of the

inherently charged political nature of this secessionist dispute, and the court's
realization of that fact, the subsequent passage by another arm of the
Government of Canada of the so-called Clarity Act 9' (which was clearly
designed to narrow the range of political manoeuvres available to Quebec) 92 is
proof positive of this assertion. It is thus clear that struggles over the possible
secession of a sub-state group from an already independent state do not become
less political, less charged, less divisive, or less high stakes, simply because
they have been submitted to a quasi-judicial, judicial 93 or other process.
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Indeed, the submission of such a claim to a quasi-judicial or judicial process is
merely the continuation of high stakes politics by other means.
It is this deeply politicized and high stakes character of most secessionist
disputes that best explains the need for such disputes to be adjudicated within a
relatively detached and independent third party dispute management forum.
That is why the more a secessionist dispute management mechanism tends to
be dyadic, the more likely it is to foster perceptions and accusations of inherent/
systemic unfairness and illegitimacy. And that is why the more such a
mechanism tends to be triadic, the less likely it is to foster perceptions and
accusations of inherent/systemic unfairness and illegitimacy. It is of course
possible that given the presence of a particular kind of political psychology
among a particular population, even a dyadic mechanism may not in fact foster
perceptions and accusations of inherent/systemic unfairness and illegitimacy.
But the point is that even in that type of context a triadic mechanism would,
with all other factors being equal, be less likely to foster perceptions and
accusations of inherent/systemic unfairness and illegitimacy.
In the context of the Quebec and Katanga cases, the question that arises is
whether, in the interest of ensuring the perceived legitimacy of the entire
process, Quebec and Katanga were entitled to expect fundamental justice in
the respective determinations regarding their entitlement to secession that were
made by the Supreme Court and the African Commission? Does this
expectation of fundamental justice entail an expectation of a triadic form of
adjudication? Does fundamental justice require inexorably the adjudication of
secession-related matters by a tribunal that is seen by all sides of the dispute to
be detached from and independent of one of the parties to the dispute? Does
fundamental justice require the adjudication of these kinds of disputes by a
third party tribunal that is completely detached and independent of one of the
disputants? If so, is this requirement only satisfied when the adjudicative
process is conducted within an external or internationaljudicial or quasijudicial tribunal? To be more concrete, is Quebec, for instance, entitled to
expect fundamental justice in the assessment of the clarity of say a disputed
referendum question related to its secessionist ambitions? Would the process of
assessing the clarity of such a question be widely perceived as unfair and/
or illegitimate were it to violate one or more of the basic requirements of
fundamental justice? And even if, in the specific socio-political context
of Canada, the basic tenets of fundamental justice (and thus the imperative for
popular legitimacy) can be said not to require a completely detached and
independent external or international institution, would such a more triadic
model of adjudication be required by the principles of fundamental justice
almost everywhere else in the world?
The central concerns here are chiefly ethical and pragmatic, as opposed to
being strictly legalistic. And in order to reflect more clearly on these questions
and concerns, it is important that we outline the nature of each of the
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alternative models of secessionist dispute management that are symbolized by
the Katanga and Quebec cases.
In the Katanga case, the Katangese Peoples' Association (a sub-state entity)
referred a secessionist dispute between itself and its parent state (Zaire) to the
African Commission (an international quasi-judicial tribunal operative only
in Africa). The African Commission constitutes of persons appointed by an
umbrella international institution, the Organization of African Unity (or
OAU).9 4 And despite the fact that the members of the OAU are all states, and
that it is the assembly of the heads of these states that appoint the members of
the African Commission, neither the Commission as a corporate whole nor any
one of its commissioners can at any one time be said to be functioning as an
official of the specific state against which a particular secessionist claim has
been brought. The Commission's diversity ensures this, 95 and its Rules of
Procedure support this characterization. 96 In any case, in this particular case,
none of the members of this eleven-person commission was either Katangese
or from the rest of Zaire.
In the Quebec case, the Governor-in-Council (one of the arms of the
Government of Canada) referred a dispute between the Government of Canada
and the Government of Quebec (which is the government of a province of
Canada) to the Supreme Court of Canada (one of the three arms of the
Government of Canada). Every single member of this court was, quite
understandably, an appointee of the executive arm of the Government of
Canada. The vast majority of the members of this court were, as understandably,
natives of other provinces in Canada (as opposed to natives of Quebec). Every
single member of this court was of course a public servant in the Government
of Canada.97
Given these features of the processes adopted in the Quebec and Katanga
cases, it is fair to conclude that the model of secessionist dispute resolution that
is symbolized by the Katanga case tended to be triadic, while that symbolized
by the Quebec case tended to be dyadic. As compared to the model symbolized
by the Katanga case (i.e. adjudication by an international tribunal), the model
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symbolized by the Quebec case (i.e. adjudication by a domestic tribunal that is an
intrinsic component of the relevant domestic government), seems to be much
more triadic. Thus, the Katanga model seems to be much more in keeping with the
basic tenets of fundamental justice already discussed. We must keep it in mind
though that what is being critiqued here is the adjudicative model that is
symbolized, as opposed to the particular case that symbolizes that model.
If this conclusion is correct, then it is also logical to conclude that the
Quebec model is open to the same kinds of concerns, regarding the deployment
of dyadic models to the field of secessionist dispute management, that have
already been discussed. It is also fair to deduce that, whatever other problems it
might have, being relatively much more triadic, the Katanga model is far more
immune from the kinds of concerns regarding fundamental justice and popular
legitimacy that have already been raised. It is also fair to conclude that, all
other things being equal, from a legitimacy perspective, the Katanga model is
a better general model for the management of secessionist disputes, especially
in those societies that are, as a factual matter, much more deeply fragmented
than others.98 For, as has already been shown, the more triadic a model of
secessionist dispute management, the more it is likely to satisfy the basic
requirements of fundamental justice, and the less it is likely to be viewed
widely as unfair, illegitimate, or both. Put differently, the failure of a
secessionist dispute management process to adhere closely with the spirit if not
the letter of any of the basic tenets of fundamental justice is likely to foster
perceptions of inherent unfairness and illegitimacy in the minds of the
perceiving public. While this sort of negative perception is likely to be more
rampant among the membership of the aggrieved sub-state group, who will
most likely be the losing side, legitimacy suffers still. The popular legitimacy
of the secessionist dispute management process suffers because such a system's
credibility and fairness is largely dependent on how it is perceived by the
losing (not the winning) side.
The conclusion that the Katanga model is on the balance preferable was
reached not merely because of the failure of the more dyadic model
(symbolized by the Quebec case) to accord with one of the basic formalistic
requirements of fundamental justice (i.e. that nemojudex in causa sua). It was
reached principally because of its greater potency to ignite charges of
98 While such deeply societies are not of course confined to the so-called 'third world', the
peculiar colonial histories of these states has resulted in the more frequent incidence of deeper then usual
fragmentation within their territories. By suddenly agglomerating thousands of previously independent
and distinct polities, with very little attention paid to their own political choices, colonial expansionists
all but ensured that the successor 'third world' states would be afflicted from the beginning by a crisis of
legitimate statehood. Moreover, the leaders of these successor states have failed in the drive to deal
effectively with these crises of legitimate statehood. Having said that, it is also clear from incidents in
places like Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and Spain that deep fragmentation is a global phenomenon. and See
O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood, supra note 12.
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unfairness and illegitimacy, and the crucial role that is played all-too-often by
perceptions of unfairness and/or illegitimacy in the degeneration of highly
charged political disputes (such as those concerning secessionist claims) into
violent conflicts. Thus, the foregoing argument is not simply an inflexible
formalist contention that the 'third party-ness' of a secessionist dispute manager
must invariably determine the perceived legitimacy of the entire model or
process of adjudication. The argument forwarded here is that in the deeply
fragmented societies in which most of the world's secessionist claims are made
the 'third party-ness' or otherwise of the secessionist dispute manager assumes
a critical place among the complex matrix of factors that influence popular
perceptions as to the unfairness and illegitimacy of the process (and even of its
outcomes). This is so because, as the literature already tells us, in such much
more deeply fragmented societies, deep distrust of the organs of the central
government are usually rife among the secessionist sub-state group, and
are more often than not quite justified. In this sense, any significant
negative decision that is made by an arm of the central government regarding
the secessionist ambitions of such sub-state groups is likely to be greeted with
often well-deserved scepticism, if not violent resentment. Yet central governments, including their judicial arms, are more likely to oppose, rather than
support the secessionist ambitions of their sub-state groups.
It is of course recognized, as many scholars already have, that the model of
secessionist dispute management symbolized by the Quebec case did (at least
in the end) serve Canada and Canadians quite well, and elicited relatively
very little outrage among even secessionist minded Quebecois. 99 But this may
be largely attributable to the fact that in the instant case the court kept to
relatively safe and generally accepted ground. 100 Moreover, the judgement
offered 'something' to each side of the dispute; something that they could
identify as a victory for their cause, something that resonated for them.' 0 ' In
addition, the court 'injected a welcome note of civility into our [i.e. Canadian]
constitutional introspection', 10 2 and conceptually eliminated extremists on both
sides from the political agenda.' 0 3 All in all, allowing for a few uncivil
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incidents such as the FLQ crisis in the 1970s, 10 4 Mary Dawson is mostly right
to suggest that:
'This Reference should be a source of pride... it is wonderful that
Canada is a country [today] where such highly charged issues as the
secession of one of its provinces can be taken to its highest
potential
0 5
1

court.'

Thus, in this particular Canadian case, the dyadic model seems to have worked
as well as a triadic model could possibly have. 10 6 But this testifies more to
the relative civility of contemporary Canadian secession politics than to the
desirability of generalizing the more dyadic model of secessionist dispute
management to other lands. Moreover, had the court found that under no
circumstances whatsoever was Quebec entitled to secede from Canada, the
outcome, legitimacy wise, may have been quite different.
Thus, for the reasons that have already been adduced, one cannot be
sanguine about the likelihood of that more dyadic model working in the same
way in societies that are much more fragmented and divided than Canada.
Moreover, despite the rarity of instances of incivility in the struggle over the
secession of Quebec from Canada, one could not be sanguine about the
capacity of the dyadic model of secessionist dispute management that is
currently favoured by the Canadian government to survive the severe
denudation of its legitimacy that might result from sustained accusations of
procedural unfairness and inherent illegitimacy. This point is buttressed by the
halo of suspicion (among the people of Quebec) that surrounded the very
decision of the Government of Canada to refer the case to the Supreme Court
of Canada. As Robert Young has noted, during the relevant period:
'Among [Quebec] nationalists, some headway - perhaps a lot of headway could be made using the argument that the court ruling, emanatingfrom
[French] Quebecois into a straight
judges appointed by Ottawa, would0put
7
jacket tailored in English Canada.' 1
Indeed, at the time the case was referred to the court by the Government of
Canada, a political advertisement placed in the media by the Government of
Quebec pointedly described the Supreme Court of Canada as much like the
'Leaning Tower of Pisa' that leans only in one direction (in this case - in the
direction of the anti-secession cause of the Government of Canada)! 108 In fact,
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the Government of Quebec had from the very beginning hinged its refusal to
participate in the hearing of the case on this clear challenge to the fairness of
the very decision to refer the case to the court,
and the legitimacy of the court's
10 9
role as the secessionist dispute manager.
Legitimacy is thus likely to be seriously compromised by the deployment of
a more dyadic model to the delicate task of secessionist dispute management
between a state and one or more of its sub-state groups. The more triadic
model, especially one that makes use of an agency external to the state (such as
an international tribunal) is more likely to avoid the specific legitimacy deficits
that attend the use of the dyadic model in deeply fragmented societies. It is in
this specific sense, that the Katanga case symbolizes a model of secessionist
dispute management that is preferable both from legitimacy-based and
pragmatic perspectives (especially as concerns states that are, as a factual
matter, much more deeply fragmented usual). As we have already seen, the more
dyadic model (according to which the courts - an arm of the government determine even the most highly charged political disputes between citizens/
groups and the very same government) is ubiquitous across the globe. But
from an ethical and pragmatic perspective, its ubiquity does not necessarily
ensure its desirability. While the deployment of more dyadic models to the
management of even the most highly charged secessionist disputes may be
legal virtually everywhere, and while such a posture is certainly a better way of
managing such disputes than the deployment of violence, such a practice is not
always pragmatically or ethically desirable. The issue here is not so much the
entitlement of states to use the Quebec model, but the ethics andpragmaticsof
the matter. And this concern is worthwhile precisely because in no society (rich
or poor, fragmented or unified) is the insistence on 'a legality that is stripped of
any ethical concerns' 110 either practicable in the long run or conducive to
sustainable peace. That is why the principles of fundamental justice (derived as
they are from widespread understandings of ethical and pragmatic imperatives)
are viewed as sacred in virtually every legal system.
The importance of substantial fidelity to this ethical/pragmatic imperative
becomes even more palpable in the context of the crisis of legitimate statehood
that currently afflicts the vast majority of states in the world. In the face of the
intense centrifugal forces generated by the restiveness of aggrieved minority or
oppressed sub-state groups, many states are under intense pressure to secure
peaceable ways of retaining such groups within their borders. One such method
is the management of the dispute by one or more of the very institutions of the
relevant central government. This has been the preferred approach virtually
everywhere in the world: from Canada to the Cameroons, from Nigeria to
109
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Mexico, from Senegal to Spain, and from Britain to Belgium. Yet, all-toooften, the central issue at stake is the structural alienation of such sub-state
groups from the institutions of the state of which they are a part. All-too-often,
it is these very institutions that have been used to exclude, oppress, or suppress
minority or powerless sub-state groups. All-too-often, these institutions are not
representative of the diversity of the relevant country. Given the intolerant
character of many such state institutions, it is hardly surprising then that many
such groups feel fundamentally excluded from the political and judicial
institutions of the relevant central government. It is not surprising as well that
many such groups have a deep-seated distrust of the institutions of the central
government (including the courts of law). In such contexts therefore, it is
hardly unreasonable to suggest that a more triadic model of secessionist dispute
management, especially one that is presided over by an external or
international third party, will be much more acceptable to aggrieved minority
or powerless sub-state groups than a more dyadic model that is presided over
by an arm of the very central government that is deeply distrusted by the substate group. It is also hardly unreasonable to suggest, in that context, that the
more triadic model will, all things being equal, be more capable of fostering a
process and outcomes that are widely viewed as fair and legitimate. If this is
so, then the more triadic model is also more likely, in such contexts, to lead to a
more sustainable solution to the crisis of legitimate statehood that afflicts the
relevant state. In this way will the overall interests of both states and minority/
powerless sub-state group be better served, at least in the long run.
It must be noted, however, that my argument in favour of a more triadic,
more external, more detached third party arbiter of secessionist disputes must
be constrained by a healthy restraint from too quickly resorting to global-level
(as opposed to regional-level) mechanisms for the management of such
disputes (especially those that occur in the so-called 'third world'). There are a
number of reasons why this might turn out to be ill advised, but this paper will
deal with only two. The first is that, because the history of (especially
unilateral) global-level intervention in such matters is, in general, an unhappy
one, it would be better to deploy regional-level mechanisms, warts and all, in
such cases."i ' The idea will be to try something that seems somewhat novel in
international relations: the provision of a sustained opportunity to regionallevel institutions in the 'third world' to 'own' and operate their own
secessionist dispute management mechanisms. Regional-level mechanisms are
rarely afflicted with the kind of 'ownership' problems that have weakened most
global-level interventions. 1 2 Again, regional-level mechanisms are much
better equipped with the necessary knowledge base and sensitivity to local
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desires without which an intervention in a high stakes political dispute (such as
one regarding secession) will be highly problematic. 1 13 And lastly, regionallevel mechanisms suffer less from the credibility problems that mechanisms
that are external to the 'third world' suffer when engaged in interventions
there. 114 For all of these reasons, it may be better to think of global-level
mechanisms as a last resort, to be deployed only when regional-level
mechanisms are not likely to escape the kind of legitimacy problems that have
already been identified.

4. Conclusions
This paper advanced at least three major arguments. The first is that the
decision in the Katanga case has left very little room for continued doubt as to
the meaning of Article 20 of the African Charter. And that regardless of our
individual views as to the justifiability of secession, Article 20 must now be
viewed as permitting, in the context of the regional international law applicable
to Africa, a limited treaty-based entitlement to secession in some highly
exceptional cases. The second is that the decision in the Quebec case is judicial
confirmation of the emergence, as part of global international law, of a highly
circumscribed entitlement to secession. The Quebec decision did not create this
entitlement, it merely affirmed its existence and grounding in a number of
existing treaty and soft-law instruments. The third is that the model of
secessionist dispute management that is symbolized by the Quebec case is
highly problematic from the legitimacy perspective. This is because of a major
ethical problem that confronts that model: i.e. its substantially dyadic (as
opposed to triadic) character; one in which an arm of the more powerful party
to the dispute is also the arbiter of the secessionist dispute. It was also
shown that, concomitantly, the model that is symbolized by the Katanga case
is preferable (from a legitimacy perspective) largely because of its much
more triadic character. For, its triadic features ensure the presence of a more
external, more detached, third party arbiter. This is so despite the relative
success of the Quebec model in the peculiar space-time context in which it was
operated. For, we must remain extremely cautious regarding the applicability
of the dyadic model in societies that are more deeply fragmented than others.
This is one circumstance in which a little caution would be healthy.
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